| Costas Yennaris | Daniel Fearn | Leopold Maurer | James Ker Lindsay |
| Niyazi Kizilyurek | Katie Clerides | Mehmet-Ali Talat | reactions |

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Costas Yennaris

• Cypriots must learn the lessons of their past through a cathartic process of self-criticism.

• He was one of the first Greek Cypriot journalists to cross the Green Line and to interview Denktash.

• Lack of translation from Turkish - Greek of Turkish documents, biographies and press means we lack knowledge of Turkish Cypriot thinking.

• The Turkish Cypriot opposition has not lived up to the expectations of ordinary Turkish Cypriots and has not done enough to counter Denktash.

• The international community is fearful of the precedent set by its inaction over Cyprus, which allowed one country to unilaterally change the borders of another. This has had consequences for its actions in places like Bosnia and Kosovo.

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Daniel Fearn

• The UK is committed to the efforts to achieve a resolution acceptable to all Cypriots.

• Tony Blair reaffirmed this in 1998 by saying that the UK wants to see a major and sustained effort to find a solution.

• A strong international message was sent by the G8 and UNSC calls in 1998 for a resolution to this ongoing problem.

• In December 1999 Kofi Annan launched a new round of proximity talks between Clerides and Denktash although the content of these discussions remains privy to the UN and the respective parties alone. However the UN confirms that the 4 points of the Secretary General’s June 1999 report were all under discussion.

• The current process of talks is taking place against a much-altered regional environment and should benefit from the impact of improved Greco-Turkish relations.

• The impact of Helsinki and the regional détente give a positive and forward-looking context to current discussions of the Cyprus Problem.

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Leopold Maurer

• Pleased to be addressing both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

• The EU is trying to establish ‘normal’ relations with the Turkish Cypriots.

• The new Commissioner for Enlargement is planning to visit Cyprus where he will address both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. He will inform them of the advantages of accession and assure the Turkish Cypriots that as EU Law will protect their basic rights, they have nothing to fear from a political solution.

• A campaign to convince the Turkish Cypriots of this is underway.

• Cyprus has experienced some problems adapting its economy to EU standards, for instance the liberalisation of the telecoms sector, the tax differentials of its large offshore sector and the equalisation of VAT. However Cyprus is far more developed than the other countries seeking EU membership, and has benefited from having a good administration and education system inherited from the British.

• Unification is not a precondition for accession; the EU’s four freedoms should form the basis of any solution.

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James Ker Lindsay

• Although it is too early to judge, there is optimism that a lasting settlement to Greek-Turkish conflict can be achieved.

• The two countries have been strengthening contact and co-operation in less contentious areas.

• There is a tendency to attribute this to the earthquakes, which struck both countries last summer. These contributed to a change in public perceptions but it should be remembered that public opinion is fickle.

• The current détente is based on something more valuable - a realisation by the Greek and Turkish administrations of a change in international affairs, highlighted by the Kosovo crisis.

• Both countries were angry at being left out of international negotiations and action over Kosovo and by claims in the foreign media that the crisis was likely to lead to a war between the two countries.

• When the devastating earthquake struck Turkey the Greeks rushed to help, the media responded with gratitude towards the ‘Greek brethren’. When an earthquake struck Greece Turkey was the first country to send aid. This gave a populist impetus to the process of rapprochement, as a result nine bilateral agreements have been signed thus far this year and the two foreign ministries are co-operating over EU issues.

• Greece and Turkey’s common aims include the desire for a peaceful and stable Balkans, identity forged through membership of the EU, land communications with Central Europe and bilateral trade to enable them to take advantage of the differing comparative advantage of each. Hence business leaders have been at the forefront of change.

• However, neither country is prepared to talk about the sensitive issues of the Aegean and Cyprus yet, to push them to do so would be dangerous and would risk de-railing the whole process.

• Therefore Papandreou cannot be accused of weakness by not addressing Cyprus, he is being realistic. In any case Greece and Turkey are subordinate to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships themselves.

• Should Turkey try to pressurise Denktash he can bypass the government by appealing to the Turkish populous itself which regards him as a national hero. Both the Greek and Turkish governments are also vulnerable to criticisms of their approach from opposition parties and would not want to risk goodwill by taking a strong stance on Cyprus.

• The EU is having a major impact for the political culture of Turkey, for instance a more lenient attitude towards the Kurds is observable. As the political culture has thus far impeded a solution to the Cyprus problem, Cyprus should not hold up Turkey’s accession, which can only have positive consequences for the island.

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Niyazi Kizilyurek

• There has been an ethnic rather than state centred development of nationalism in Cyprus.

• Need to develop a political community based on Cypriot citizenry.

• Nationalism took hold in the Turkish Cypriot community about a century after it had arisen in the Greek Cypriot community.

• The growth of Greek Cypriot national consciousness and demands for enosis led to the growth of Turkish Cypriot nationalism and the demand for partition (taksim).

• These mutually exclusive nationalisms held no desire for state building, the competing demands for enosis and partition led to intolerance and conflict.

• The demand for enosis fused cultural and political values, as Makarios remarked “We have built a state but not a nation”. Hence no shared sense of patriotism developed.

• The secession of the Turkish Cypriot minority is neither practical nor desirable, can’t draw a border due to wide dispersion of Turkish Cypriots across the island.

• The answer therefore must be political accommodation in one state and partnership between the two communities.

• Granting group as well as individual rights may give rise to competing loyalties, group rights may also be used to restrict interaction.

• However denying self-government and group rights encourages secession, Cyprus needs an acceptable form of asymmetrical federation. The EU can be of great use in achieving this.

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Katie Clerides

• The CCC is a perfect example of citizen diplomacy and an appropriate forum to be addressing.

• Bi-communal contacts have increased under the auspices of the Cypriots themselves. There have been meetings of up to 5000 Cypriots at the Lidra Palace, with Turkish Cypriots in particular queuing up to see the Greek Cypriots who they have been divided from for so long.

• Unfortunately Denktash has ceased to grant permission for meetings such as this to take place, although Pyla remains a focal point for more recent initiatives.

• It is encouraging that young people are at the forefront of bi-communal initiatives as many have never met people from the other community and have often been brought up to regard them as ‘the enemy’.

• The sharing of experiences on a one to one basis enables us to appreciate mutual suffering.

• Denktash’s position continues to be strong as he is seen as a national hero in Turkey itself and can exploit this to bypass administrations which might want him to take a more moderate line on Cyprus. The Turkish military also continue to cling to the strategic significance of having a presence in Cyprus.

• Politicians who desire a solution need to work across communal and political lines.

• Greek and Turkish Cypriot political parties have been exchanging articles, it is important for people to hear first hand what politicians say rather than having their opinions filtered through, or distorted by the press.

• The economic advantages of a unified Cyprus benefit both communities, especially the educated young who are reluctant to return to Cyprus due to a lack of opportunities.

• Cyprus needs to link up with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process. This should demonstrate to the two communities that they can work together without feeling that they have betrayed their national country.

• The possibility of setting up a bi-communal newspaper and a bi-communal radio station are being discussed.

Mehmet-Ali Talat

• Enosis became the national struggle for the Greek Cypriots and in response, the notion of taksim (meaning ‘double annexation’, part of Cyprus to be annexed by Greece and the other by Turkey) became a national cause for Turkish Cypriots.

• In 1960 a ‘functional federation’ was constructed, with 3 of the 7 positions on the Council of Ministers reserved for Turkish Cypriots and a veto available to the Turkish Cypriot vice president. Important decisions required the approval of both communities.

• Both sides were dissatisfied and prepared for new conflicts.

• The Turkish Cypriot rejected Makarios’s 13-point amendments to the constitution which threatened their rights, this led to tension and inter-communal armed strife.

• Turkish Cypriots gathered in 103 enclaves and have denied the authority of the Republic of Cyprus government since 1963.

• Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974 following the coup d’etat to prevent the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, using the rights invested in it as a guarantor power.

• Partition was achieved and the TRNC declared. The Republic of Cyprus is unfairly recognised as the legitimate government of the whole island by the international community, which has also imposed embargoes on the north.

• Post Cold War realities have altered the international climate. The Cyprus problem has become a European problem and also a foreign policy instrument for both Greek and Turkish international relations.

• The decision of the EU to accept the application of Cyprus for membership was unjust and biased towards Greek Cypriot interests. However the Helsinki decision to also consider Turkey’s application has been a seminal turning point for the Cyprus Problem.

• Europeanisation has been a dream in Turkey for 150 years now and so it will undoubtedly have to resolve the Cyprus problem if it is to realise this aim.

• Due to the overlapping interests embodied by the EU, the post cold war relaxation of tensions and the closer relationship between Greece and Turkey forged since the earthquakes, this is the right time for a solution.

• Bi-communal contacts on all levels can be the best remedy for the correction of misperceptions. Hence, confidence building measures have to be regarded integral parts of a viable and workable solution.

• Likelihood of viable co-operation under the umbrella of the EU.

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 A selection of reactions to the conference:

 “Congratulations to you all for this very informative, challenging, but above all hopeful event. The future of Cyprus depends on young people like you. A very positive and hopeful conference, with the right mixture of analysis, information and experience, with proper attention to creating and supporting a climate for change rather than a 'who can we blame?' agenda.”
- Colin Robb

“I just wanted to thank you and all of your colleagues for organising an excellent conference. I found it one of the most positive conferences I have attended on Cyprus and greatly enjoyed meeting all of you.”
- James Ker Lindsay